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1. Introduction 
 The theory of decision-making under ambiguity (or uncertainty), as distinct from that under 
risk, is well-developed in the literature. An ambiguous (uncertain) situation is when objective 
probabilities are not specified. Under certain assumptions (see, in particular, Savage 1954), agents 
act as if they attach subjective additive probabilities to the various events. However, the seminal 
work of Ellsberg (1961), and many subsequent experiments, have shown that people behave in a 
way which suggests that they are not able to attach subjective (Savage-type) probabilities to 
ambiguous or uncertain events. In particular, it seems to be the case that whatever measures of 
‘probability’ are used to describe behaviour, they violate the laws of probability and specifically 
that of additivity. As a consequence, many economists regard the assumptions of the Savage theory 
as being excessively strong, and the conclusion that subjective probabilities are additive as 
unrealistic. From the large experimental literature on the Ellsberg paradox a substantial theoretical 
literature has developed, which relaxes the Savage assumptions and has led to a large number of 
alternatives to the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) preference functional proposed by Savage. An 
early survey can be found in Camerer and Weber (1992), while some more recent articles are cited 
in Halevy (2007). 
The experimental literature is extensive. It can be roughly grouped in three streams: first, 
experiments reproducing the Ellsberg paradox under various conditions (for example, Sarin and 
Weber 1993); second, experiments testing particular theories4 (for example, Tversky and Fox 1995, 
Di Mauro and Maffioletti 1996); third, experiments reproducing the Ellsberg paradox and testing 
theories by using real events5 rather than a random device in order to represent uncertainty. The 
rationale for this latter line of research is the presupposition that any random device used to 
represent uncertainty can be reduced to a second order probability (Keppe and Weber 1995, Chow 
                                                 
4 A good recent example is Halevy (2007), which tests between Choquet Expected Utility, Maximin Expected Utility, 
Recursive Non-Expected Utility and Recursive Expected Utility. 
5 For instance, the temperature at noon in Tokyo or San Francisco. 
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and Sarin 2001, 2002, Abdellaoui, Vossmann and Weber, 2005) – the conclusion being that these 
experiments do not and cannot replicate the Ellsberg paradox in its original and simple form. 
The research reported in this paper is located in the second stream outlined above – 
consisting of work that empirically investigates alternative models to the Savage theory of 
Subjective Expected Utility theory. Most of existing literature in this stream is devoted to testing 
between various competing models. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study which 
attempts to estimate the various proposed preference functionals and determine which fits the best. 
This is what this present study does. Moreover, it does so using a unique experimental 
design in which we create genuine ambiguity in the laboratory, and in which we have different 
treatments with differing amounts of ambiguity. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we describe our method for producing 
genuine ambiguity in the laboratory and the experimental procedure that we implemented. In 
section 4 we discuss the various preference functionals that we estimate. The estimates themselves 
are presented in section 5. Section 6 is devoted to the issue of the additivity of our estimates. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Creating Ambiguity in the Laboratory 
 The key issue when designing an experiment on ambiguity is that of creating ambiguity in 
the laboratory. The classic Ellsberg method, of simply saying that “there are 100 balls in an urn but 
the number of black and white is not known”, would be considered too simple given modern 
experimental standards. Subjects are now trained to be naturally suspicious and expect to be given 
full information. Moreover, given that experiments in economics nowadays invariably have 
monetary incentives, and lotteries are played out, there will come a time when the Ellsberg urn has 
to be shown. Ex ante subjects will ask “how was the composition of the balls determined?”. What 
 4
does the experimenter say? What, in fact, does he or she do to compose the Ellsberg Urn? If there is 
some drawing of a random number from the set [0,1,…,100] to determine the number of black balls 
in the urn, then the situation is no longer ambiguous: it is transformed from true ambiguity to (either 
objective or subjects’ interpretation of) second-order probabilities. Is that what Ellsberg had in 
mind? Is that an ambiguous situation? Moreover, if the experimenter refuses to answer questions 
from the subjects, then quite understandably they get suspicious and try and imagine ways of 
constructing the Ellsberg urn which would minimise the payment from the experimenter. 
 Ways of generating ambiguity in the laboratory which do not use a random device have 
other problems. The classic way is to have statements about which the subject may know nothing. 
For example, “state 1 occurs if the stock exchange index in Accra at 12 noon tomorrow is above 
36777”. But what happens if you have a Ghanaian in your subjects? Or a world expert on stock 
exchanges in strange places? There is no longer ambiguity for all the subjects. The experimenter has 
lost control. 
 The key issues are: (1) that the experimenter cannot (and cannot be seen to) manipulate the 
implementation of the ambiguity device; (2) that it is transparent; (3) that probabilities cannot be 
calculated on an objective basis; and (4) that the existence and amount of ambiguity is not subject-
specific. 
 Our method of creating ambiguity in the laboratory is simple – we use an old-fashioned 
British Bingo Blower. If you did not grow up in Britain during the 1900’s you may not be aware of 
what this is – but the amusement arcades in all the seaside resorts always had such a Bingo Blower. 
By the time we realised that this was what we needed for our ambiguity experiments, they were 
almost defunct and we found one (on eBay) only after a four-year search. A picture does not do 
justice to it – as it is only when it is in action does it reveal its true merits. In our case, the Bingo 
Blower is a rectangular-shaped, glass-sided, object some 3 feet high and 2 feet by 2 feet in 
horizontal section. Inside the glass walls are a set of balls – in continuous motion – being moved 
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about by a jet of wind from a fan in the base. When the time comes to eject one of the balls from the 
Blower, a transparent tube is rotated and a ball expelled at random up the tube through the pressure 
of the wind created by the fan. It is all physical, nothing electronic and un-manipulatable. There is 
no way that the identity of the ball being ejected can be selected – by either the experimenter or the 
subject. Moreover - and this is crucial to our design - all the balls inside the Blower can at all times 
be seen by people outside, but - unless the number of balls in the Blower is low - the number of 
balls of differing colours can not be counted: they are continually moving around. Hence the balls 
in the bingo can be seen but not counted, and the information available is not sufficient to calculate 
objective probabilities6. Moreover, recalling what Ellsberg (1961 p 657) wrote, in addition to the 
likelihood of the event and the desirability of the payoff, a third dimension is important: 
“…the nature of one’s information concerning the likelihood of events. What is at issue might be 
called the ambiguity of this information……giving rise to one’s degree of “confidence” in an 
estimate of the relative likelihood” Ellsberg (1961) p.657 
 
We can manipulate this third factor by varying the total number of balls in the Blower while 
keeping the relative numbers constant.  
 Finally we note that a further advantage of this way of creating ambiguity in the laboratory 
is the fact that the information available is the same for all subjects. Hence there is no role for 
‘comparative ignorance’ (Fox and Tversky 1995), and hence we can exclude such a factor as a 
possible explanation of behaviour. 
 
 
3. The Precise Implementation 
 We now had to decide the form of the experiment. Rather than getting subjects to value 
lotteries defined on the Bingo Blower, we decided to give them a set of n pairwise choice questions 
                                                 
6 Though, of course, there are objective probabilities which the subjects could know if they could count the numbers of 
balls of different colours – but they cannot (unless the total number of balls in the Blower is small). 
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between (pairs of) lotteries, and incentivate them by choosing at random, after they had expressed 
their preference on each of the n questions, one of the n questions and playing out their preferred 
lottery on that question. The reasons for this are that: pairwise choice questions are easier to explain 
to subjects; easier for them to understand; and less prone to problems of understanding associated 
with the various mechanisms (such as the Becker-Degroot-Marschak method) for eliciting 
valuations. 
 It was decided that there would be balls of m different colours in the Blower, and lotteries 
would be defined in terms of amounts of money and an associated colour. For example, the lottery 
(£100, pink; £10, blue; -£10, yellow) defines a lottery in which the subject would be paid £100 if 
the ball ejected was pink, £10 if the ball ejected was blue, and would lose £10 if the ball ejected was 
yellow. We then had to decide on n and m. The value of m clearly determines the number of 
possible states: with m = 2 then there are just four states: , , ,  and a b a b∅ ∪  (where a and b are the 
two colours); if m = 3 then there are 8 states: , , , , , ,  and a b c a b a c b c a b c∅ ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ (where a, b 
and c are the three colours). In general, with m colours, there are 2m states. Clearly m = 2 is 
(relatively) uninteresting, while with m greater than 3 there are more than 15 different states. As 
with certain of the models that we are going to fit, and in particular the Choquet Expected Utility 
model, we need to estimate the weights on each of the possible states, we need to keep m low in 
order to conserve on degrees of freedom. We chose m = 3 and hence had 3 colours: pink, blue and 
yellow. We also decided that there would be three amounts of money – three possible prizes – x1, x2 
and x3. This implies that we need, in addition, to estimate one utility value – that of x2 – normalising 
the other two to 0 and 1 respectively. 
 We now had to decide on the number n of pairwise choice questions. With 3 colours and 
with 3 amounts of money there are 33 = 27 possible lotteries that can be composed and hence 
27x26/2 = 351 possible different pairwise choice questions. Eliminating those questions in which 
there is stochastic (first-order) dominance, leaves us with 162 questions. This appears a lot. 
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However, extensive simulation work before the implementation of the experiment convinced us that 
we needed this many to get accurate estimates. Moreover, even if we forced subjects to spend 30 
seconds answering each question (which we did), the substantive part of the experiment lasted just 
81 minutes. 
 Next we had to decide on the three outcomes: x1, x2 and x3. We chose the numbers in the 
example above; -£10, £10 and £100. In addition we gave the subjects a participation fee of £10. 
Thus their take-away earnings at the end of the experiment were either £0, £20 or £110. Such high 
amounts of money were necessary to get an incentive to take the experiment seriously. For a risk-
neutral subject, who knew the correct probabilities, his or her expected earnings from the 
experiment were £46.63 (plus the participation fee), while if this subject just answered the questions 
at random his or her expected earnings would be £33.33 (plus the participation fee). 
 Finally we had to decide the actual numbers of balls in the Bingo Blower. For obvious 
reasons we did not want the same number of each colour. Moreover, we wanted different treatments 
in which the amount of ambiguity varied. We chose: 
 Treatment 1:  2 pink, 5 blue, 3 yellow 
 Treatment 2:  4 pink, 10 blue, 6 yellow 
 Treatment 3:  8 pink, 20 blue, 12 yellow. 
In Treatment 1, it is actually possible to count the balls of each colour – so this is a situation of risk. 
In Treatment 2, it is just about possible to count the number of pink balls and begin to guess the 
number of yellow balls but it is impossible to count the number of blue balls. In Treatment 3 it is 
impossible to count the balls of any colour. We would say that the amount of ambiguity increases as 
we go through the treatments: it is effectively zero in Treatment 1, positive in Treatments 2 and 3  
but higher in Treatment 3. 
 This completes the description of the design. We recruited 48 subjects – 15 on Treatment 1, 
17 on Treatment 2 and 16 on Treatment 3. As we have already noted, this was an expensive 
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experiment and we paid out a total of £2130 – equal to £44.37 per subject7. Subjects were recruited 
using the ORSEE (Greiner 2004) software and the experiment was conducted in the EXEC 
laboratory at the University of York. In the laboratory the Bingo Blower was on display, in action, 
in the middle of the room, throughout the whole of the experimental session. In addition, images of 
the Blower were projected via a video camera onto two big screens in the lab. Subjects were free at 
any stage to go closer to the Blower to examine it as much as they wanted. At the beginning of the 
experiment, subjects were taken into the laboratory and given written Instructions (available in the 
Appendix). They were then allowed to turn to the computer, which repeated the Instructions. The 
experimenter then responded to any questions, and the subjects were allowed to begin answering 
the 162 pairwise choice questions8. The software was designed so that they had to spend a minimum 
of 30 seconds before they could move on to the next question (though they could take more time if 
they wanted). When they had answered all 162 questions, they called over an experimenter and 
drew a numbered ticket from a box containing tickets numbered from 1 to 162. The computer then 
recalled their answer to that question. At that point the subject and the experimenter went over to 
the Bingo Blower and expelled one ball. The colour of the ball, the question picked at random and 
their answer to that question determined their payment. They filled in a brief questionnaire, were 
paid, signed a receipt and were free to go. 
 
 
4. The Preference Functionals Estimated 
 This section describes the various preference functionals that we fitted to the data. We note 
that none of these functionals involve the use of second order probabilities9. There are two reasons 
                                                 
7 It is interesting to note that this is considerably larger than the expected payment if subjects just answered randomly – 
suggesting that they did not. We shall test this formally later. 
8 The order of the questions and the left-right juxtaposition of the two lotteries on the screen were randomised. 
9 There is a good discussion of such models in Halevy (2007). Key references are: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) who 
introduced Maxmin Expected Utility theory; Segal (1987), who introduced Recursive Non-Expected Utility theory; and 
Klibanoff et al (2005) and others who explored Recursive Expected Utility theory. 
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for this. First, that the experimental setting does not invoke the use of such second order 
probabilities. Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if the subjects were using some second-
order probability rule, we do not have enough data to estimate the various second-order 
distributions10. Moreover, none of these functionals include any reference to ‘comparative 
ignorance’ (Fox and Tversky 1995), because all subjects were equally informed. 
 As we have already noted there were three possible outcomes in the experiment (x1, x2 and 
x3). We normalise the highest to have a utility of 1 and the lowest to have a utility of 0; we denote 
the utility of the middle outcome by u. We denote the three colours by a, b and c. A lottery can be 
denoted by  
 1 1 2 2 3 3( , ; , ; , )L x S x S x S=  (1) 
Here Si is the state (one of , , , , , ,  and a b c a b a c b c a b c∅ ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ ) in which the lottery pays out 
xi. We now describe the various preference functionals estimated. 
 
 A. Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU) 
 In this subjects choose between lotteries on the basis of their expected utility, calculated on 
the basis of the subject’s subjective probabilities attached to the various states. The expected utility 
of the lottery L is given by 
 2 3( )EU L p u p= +  (2) 
where pi is the (subjective) probability of state i. If we use the notation that pi = P(Si) where Si  
denotes the state in which the lottery pays out xi, then we have  
 
( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1
a b c
a b a c b c
a b c
P
P a p P b p P c p
P a b p p P a c p p P b c p p
P a b c p p p
∅ =
= = =
∪ = + ∪ = + ∪ = +
∪ ∪ = + + =
 (3) 
                                                 
10 Indeed one could argue that many of these second-order models simply are not identifiable. 
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where , anda b cp p p are the subject’s subjective probabilities for the three colours. In this model we 
estimate u, pa, pb and pc (subject to the constraint that 1a b cp p p+ + = ). 
 
 B. Prospect Theory (PT) 
 This is a preference functional ‘between’ that of SEU and the Choquet Expected Utility 
functional. We should say at the outset that we are hesitant about the acceptability of this term being 
used in this context, but it seems appropriate. Prospect Theory (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
envisages utilities being weighted by some function of the ‘true’ probabilities. If there are true 
probabilities of the various colours πa, πb and πc then Prospect Theory envisages them being 
replaced by f(πa), f(πb) and f(πc). If we denote these respectively by pa, pb and pc then we get this 
specification. It is precisely the same as the Expected Utility preference functional except for the 
fact that the ‘probabilities’ are not additive. In this model we estimate u, pa, pb and pc (but no longer 
subject to the constraint that 1a b cp p p+ + = ). We note that this preference functional may not 
satisfy dominance (though it does so in this context), unlike the Choquet preference functional, 
which does. It could also be interpreted as a model in which the decision-maker has several possible 
probabilities for each of the three colours, and works with the minimum probability for each colour. 
 
 C. Choquet Expected Utility theory (CEU) 
 Here the Choquet Expected Utility of the lottery L is given by 
 23 3 23 3 3( ) (1 ) ( )CEU L w u w u w w u w= + − = − +  (4) 
where wi is the Choquet capacity (or weight11) of state i. If we use the notation that wi = W(Si) 
where Si  denotes the state in which the lottery pays out xi, then we have, in order to satisfy the 
Choquet conditions, that 
                                                 
11 We borrow this term from Rank Dependent Expected Utility theory, which has strong affinities with Choquet 
Expected Utility theory. 
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( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1
a b c
ab ac bc
W
W a w W b w W c w
W a b w W a c w W b c w
W a b c
∅ =
= = =
∪ = ∪ = ∪ =
∪ ∪ =
 (5) 
Here , , , anda b c ab ac bcw w w w w w are the subject’s Choquet capacities (or weights) for the various 
possible states. In this model we estimate , , , , anda b c ab ac bcu w w w w w w . Note that there is no 
necessity that wde = wd + we for any d or e. That is, there is no necessity that the weights are 
additive (probabilities). Indeed this is the main difference between Expected Utility theory and 
Choquet Expected Utility theory. In our estimates we will be particularly interested in the degree of 
additivity of the estimated weights. 
 
 D. Maximin 
 In this, the decision maker is presumed to follow the rule of choosing the lottery for which 
the worst outcome is the best. We assume that the rule is followed lexicographically, so that we get 
the following rule, where l1, l2 and l3 denote the three outcomes on one of the two lotteries, L, 
ordered from the worst to the best, and m1, m2 and m3 denote the outcomes on the other lottery, M, 
also ordered from the worst to the best: 
 
1 1
1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 2 3 3
if  then 
if  then 
if  and  then 
if  and  then 
if ,  and  then 
if ,  and  then 
if ,  and  then 
l m L M
l m L M
l m l m L M
l m l m L M
l m l m l m L M
l m l m l m L M
l m l m l m L M
>
<
= >
= <
= = >
= = <
= = =
;
≺
;
≺
;
≺
∼
 (6) 
We note that there are no parameters to be estimated in this model, though we do assume that the 
decision maker ranks £100 as the best outcome, £10 as the second best and -£10 as the worst. 
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 E. Maximax 
 In this the decision maker is presumed to follow the rule of choosing the lottery for which 
the best outcome is the best. We assume that the rule is followed lexicographically, so that we get 
the following rule, using the same notation as above: 
 
3 3
3 3
3 3 2 2
3 3 2 2
3 3 2 2 1 1
3 3 2 2 1 1
3 3 2 2 1 1
if  then 
if  then 
if  and  then 
if  and  then 
if ,  and  then 
if ,  and  then 
if ,  and  then 
l m L M
l m L M
l m l m L M
l m l m L M
l m l m l m L M
l m l m l m L M
l m l m l m L M
>
<
= >
= <
= = >
= = <
= = =
;
≺
;
≺
;
≺
∼
 (7) 
Again there are no parameters to estimate. 
 
 F. Minimax Regret12 
 With this preference functional, the decision maker is envisaged as imagining each possible 
ball drawn, calculating the regret associated with choosing each of the two lotteries, and choosing 
the lottery for which the maximum regret is minimized. Again there are no parameters to estimate, 
though it is assumed that there is a larger regret associated with a larger difference between the 
outcome on the chosen lottery and the outcome on the non-chosen lottery. 
 
 
5. The Estimated Preference Functionals 
 Estimation was carried out using maximum likelihood and implemented with GAUSS. We 
made the following assumptions about the stochastic specification. For the SEU, CEU and PT 
preference functionals we assumed a Fechnerian error story. That is, we assumed that the preference 
functionals were measured with error, such that the difference in the evaluations of the two lotteries 
                                                 
12 See Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
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was normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation s. We estimate the parameter s along 
with the other parameters. For the remaining preference functionals, where the implementation is 
lexicographic, we adopted a tremble model (see Loomes et al 2002): that is, we assumed that the 
subject implemented the desired choice with probability (1-w) and chose at random with probability 
w. We estimate the parameter w along with the other parameters. 
 First, we compare the fitted preference functionals in terms of their log-likelihoods. Table 1 
reports these log-likelihoods13. The asterisk indicates the model with the highest log-likelihood. It 
should, however, be noted that this does not take into account the different degrees of freedom of 
the various functional forms. We have the following numbers of estimated parameters: SEU 4; PT 
5;  CEU 8: Maximin 1; Maximax 2; Minimum Regret 1. The SEU model is nested within the PT 
model and that, in turn, is nested within the CEU model. We can therefore carry out standard 
likelihood ratio tests comparing these three models. The results are in Table 2. We also carry out 
Vuong tests (see Vuong 1989) comparing the non-nested models. This considers two models and 
tests the null hypothesis that the two models are equally close to the ‘true model’. The test statistic 
has approximately a unit normal distribution. Positive significance indicates that the first model is 
closer to the true model while negative significance indicates that the second is closer to the true 
model. Combining the results from Tables 2 and 3 we get Table 4 which indicates the ‘best-fitting 
model’ in each case. We adopted a lexicographic process to arrive at this table. If, on the log-
likelihood ratio tests CEU fitted significantly better than SEU and PT, and on the Vuong tests CEU 
was closer to the true model than Maximin, Maximax and Minimax Regret, then we declared CEU 
the best model. If, however, CEU was not significantly better than SEU on the log-likelihood ratio 
tests but SEU was better than PT while SEU was closer to the true model than Maximin, Maximax 
and Minimax Regret, then we declared SEU the best model. And so on. 
                                                 
13 We note that all the log-likelihoods reject the null hypothesis that the subjects are responding at random. 
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 Several subjects are interesting. Subject 25 is clearly risk-neutral (the estimated value of u is 
0.1) and is working with what he or she thinks are the correct probabilities (but which are not). 
Subjects 35 and 36 have values 1/3 for the weights on the colours individually and 2/3 on the 
various pairwise combinations and an estimated value for u equal to 0.514. These subjects, while 
having behaviour consistent with CEU, are obviously using a simple rule of thumb: for each lottery 
they give 0 points for any outcome of -£10, 1 point for an outcome of £10, and 2 points to an 
outcome of £100. They then add these points and chose the lottery for which the sum of the points 
is the largest. Subject 41, while apparently using Maximax, can also be interpreted (since he or she 
has values 1/3 for the weights on the colours individually and 2/3 on the various pairwise 
combinations and an estimated value for u equal to 1/3) as following a similar rule but with 3 points 
for an outcome of £100. Such rules of thumb do not, to the best of our knowledge, appear in the 
literature. Classifying these subjects as using Rules of Thumb and summarising Table 4 we get the 
following bottom line: 
Model(s) Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 TOTALS 
SEU 4 4 4 12 
PT 2 6 3 11 
CEU 9 5 5 19 
Maximin 0 1 0 1 
Maximax 0 0 1 1 
Minimax Regret 0 0 0 0 
Rule of Thumb 0 1 3 4 
TOTALS 15 17 16 48 
 
 
 
6. Additivity 
 In the previous literature, there were no direct estimates of the parameters of the CEU 
preference functional, and hence attitude to ambiguity was measured simply through capacities not 
being additive. However, since we are able to directly estimate the parameters of the CEU 
                                                 
14 The estimated parameters are in an Appendix, available on request. 
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preference functional, we can explore our results in terms of measures of additivity. There are 
various measures that one can calculate. For the CEU estimates to be consistent with SEU we need 
the following conditions (obviously not independent of each other) to hold: 
 
1
2
3
4
5
1
( ) / 2 1
( ) 1
( ) 1
( ) 1
a b c
bc ac ac
a bc
b ac
c ab
S w w w
S w w w
S w w
S w w
S w w
= + + =
= + + =
= + =
= + =
= + =
 (8) 
 We define S1 through S5 as our additivity measures. All should equal 1 for SEU to hold. 
Figure 1 shows a scatter of S2 against S1 by treatment. Table 5 reports the means and standard 
deviations of all five measures by treatment. Interestingly the measures for Treatment 1 (effectively 
a case of risk rather than ambiguity) are all a little (but not significantly) over 1.0, and average 
1.0322. In Treatment 2, a case of ambiguity, they are on average (1.0646) a little higher, while in 
Treatment 3, with higher ambiguity, they are all well below 1, averaging 0.9348. In this latter case 
there is clear sub-additivity – as the theorists suspect. 
 We can also look at the individual attitudes towards ambiguity as measured through these 
additivity measures. In table 6 we show for each treatment and each definition of additivity ( 1S , 2S , 
3S , 4S  or 5S ) the percentages of subjects who are ambiguity-loving or ambiguity-averse
15. It 
emerges that there are 29 ambiguity-averse subjects ( 1S <1) and 19 ambiguity-loving subjects 
( 1S >1) using  the usual definition of additivity. As we can also see from the same tables there is a 
slight increase in the number of subjects who change from ambiguity-aversion to ambiguity-loving 
as the number of balls contained in the bingo increases – that is, as the ambiguity increases. It can 
also be noted that the different measures of additivity, which depend on different partitions of the 
same event space are not the same. This latter result is consistent with Support Theory (Tversky and 
                                                 
15 We define as ambiguity-neutral a subject whose sum of probability of disjoint events is equal to 1, as ambiguity-
averse a subject whose sum of probability of disjoint events is less than 1 and as ambiguity-loving a subject whose sum 
of probability of disjoint events is more than 1. We note that none of our subjects, using the parameter estimates for the 
CEU functional, were exactly ambiguity-neutral. 
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Koehler 1994) and other psychological theories (Fox and Rottenstreich 2003), that allow for 
judgemental probability or individual belief to depend on the description of the events.  
 Figure 2 shows further interesting evidence: in all graphs S1  is on the horizontal axis; in 2.1 
S3 is on the vertical axis; in 2.2 S4 is on the vertical axis; in 2.3 S5 is on the vertical axis; the sloping 
line is the 45º line. There are separate scatters in each figure for the different treatments. One thing 
seems clear: as a general rule we see that S3 > S1, S4 > S1 and  S5 > S1 when the measures indicate 
sub-additivity and S3 < S1, S4 < S1 and  S5 < S1 when the measures indicate super-additivity.   
 It is instructive to examine these latter results in more detail. If Si > S1 for i >2, it follows 
that ab a bw w w> +  for some pair of colours a and b. So the weight on the union of a and b is greater 
than the sum of the weights on a and b separately. We see that this generally occurs when  S1 < 1, 
that is, when the subject displays ambiguity-aversion. These subjects, according to our estimates, 
generally have a weight on the union of two colours greater than the sum of the weights on the same 
two colours individually. This seems to accord with intuition concerning the meaning of ambiguity-
aversion. In contrast, for those subjects who display ambiguity-loving, their weight on the union is 
less than the sum of the weights individually. These findings seem to make good sense. 
 We had hoped to see some differences in the degree of additivity across the three treatments, 
but it is difficult to see much difference between the various scatters. It should, however, be recalled 
that we only have a total of 48 observations. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper we have provided what we believe are the first estimates of preference 
functionals under ambiguity using data from an experiment in which there is genuine ambiguity in 
the experimental task. Moreover, we have different treatments with different degrees of ambiguity.  
Our results show that some 25% of the subjects act in accordance with Subjective Expected Utility 
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theory, and hence attach (additive) subjective probabilities to the various states. Some 23% of the 
subjects use (our interpretation of) Prospect Theory (in its original form) and hence attach non-
additive subjective probabilities to the various simple states. A further 38% of the subjects seem to 
use Choquet Expected Utility and hence attach non-additive capacities (or weights) to the various 
states (both simple and compound). A few use Maximin, Maximax and simple Rules of Thumb. 
Indeed we have identified a new Rule of Thumb which is easy to implement in this context. 
 We discover a range of attitudes towards ambiguity, with both ambiguity-averse and 
ambiguity-loving subjects in our sample. Moreover, those subjects who are ambiguity-averse 
(loving) seem to have a weight on the union of two events greater (less) than the sum of the weights 
attached to the individual events. 
 What we failed to find clear evidence on was the effect of increasing ambiguity on the 
preference functionals used. Treatment 1 was essentially a case of risk while Treatments 2 and 3 
showed ambiguity, with more ambiguity in the latter. However, there is no obvious difference 
between behaviour in the three treatments, except for a slight tendency for more Rules of Thumb to 
be used when there is an increase in ambiguity. This could be a result of the small numbers of 
subjects in our sample. Further work is required to explore further the implications. 
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Table 1: The Log-Likelihoods of the various functional forms (* indicates the highest LL) 
subject SEU PT CEU Maximin Maximax Minimax 
Regret 
1 -16.3936 -13.5371 -3.8593* -37.5349 -88.2474 -88.2474 
2 -31.9309 -26.3077 -25.0640* -77.6248 -52.2226 -58.5595 
3 -26.1971 -22.3794 -16.1582* -80.5076 -80.5076 -87.0474 
4 -24.0772 -24.0573 -14.2056* -79.0862 -45.2583 -56.5108 
5 -6.2671 -6.2671 -3.9524* -56.5108 -98.4463 -98.4463 
6 -17.1767 -12.8252 -8.9046* -10.7765 -74.5783 -72.9909 
7 -37.9959 -31.0934 -29.8623* -64.3577 -47.6564 -58.5595 
8 -27.4427 -22.0363 -21.0722* -79.0862 -84.5417 -90.5449 
9 -26.5198 -16.1746 -12.1479* -71.3590 -90.5449 -92.7095 
10 -33.3195 -32.7294 -30.5403* -60.5485 -77.6248 -79.0862 
11 -33.2107 -25.7538 -23.5967* -58.5595 -76.1226 -81.8901 
12 -41.7651 -36.8833 -32.5486* -64.3577 -85.8124 -91.6435 
13 -16.7974 -16.7974 -15.9764* -58.5595 -99.2966 -98.4463 
14 -30.4775 -25.9931 -20.2295* -87.0474 -69.6813 -76.1226 
15 -30.2564 -29.8099 -25.8302* -40.2045 -89.4130 -89.4130 
16 -69.0147 -68.5726 -65.6452* -104.4464 -96.6566 -97.5665 
17 -17.9054 -12.7410 -10.8748* -52.2226 -80.5076 -83.2345 
18 -29.5882 -17.7773 -16.0873* -76.1226 -72.9909 -79.0862 
19 -21.6397 -21.6224 -17.7990* -52.2226 -85.8124 -87.0474 
20 -24.6320 -24.3416 -23.0134* -40.2045 -84.5417 -85.8124 
21 -47.0512 -41.5665 -35.7003* -67.9563 -80.5076 -87.0474 
22 -53.7313 -50.0000 -49.2475* -74.5783 -74.5783 -81.8901 
23 -28.3288 -28.0443 -27.4709 -22.3128* -74.5783 -72.9909 
24 -54.6523 -49.7872 -44.4599* -74.5783 -76.1226 -83.2345 
25 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* -96.6566 -52.2226 -64.3577 
26 -22.4209 -22.3374 -21.5572* -49.9763 -79.0862 -80.5076 
27 -35.5261 -32.8166 -29.2171* -66.1824 -93.7433 -95.7164 
28 -32.1557 -30.1588 -28.9741* -64.3577 -98.4463 -97.5665 
29 -35.8260 -33.0205 -27.1318* -91.6435 -79.0862 -84.5417 
30 -53.1288 -52.8768 -48.1509* -79.0862 -56.5108 -66.1824 
31 -31.2604 -27.8191 -26.6412* -67.9563 -85.8124 -88.2474 
32 -37.3533 -20.4654 -19.4992* -69.6813 -58.5595 -67.9563 
33 -22.3461 -22.0537 -17.0730* -64.3577 -80.5076 -83.2345 
34 -29.7881 -27.3112 -23.9688* -34.7586 -84.5417 -85.8124 
35 -28.7992 -28.7763 -23.0808* -60.5485 -37.5349 -52.2226 
36 -36.0849 -32.2506 -22.4238* -37.5349 -62.4805 -62.4805 
37 -27.4019 -21.4020 -18.6183* -54.3996 -93.7433 -92.7095 
38 -25.3586 -25.3055 -24.2999* -88.2474 -96.6566 -98.4463 
39 -89.0304 -21.3118 -20.5653 -77.6248 0.0000* -18.7554 
40 -13.8012 -13.8012 -12.2077* -18.7554 -83.2345 -83.2345 
41 -6.6484 -6.4681 -3.9830 -77.6248 0.0000* -22.3128 
42 -26.9787 -16.8200 -15.9348* -67.9563 -90.5449 -92.7095 
43 -33.4483 -13.2807 -12.3331* -56.5108 -42.7764 -52.2226 
44 -25.0722 -25.0475 -24.7430* -91.6435 -54.3996 -64.3577 
45 -4.3845 -4.3819 -3.9005* -54.3996 -97.5665 -97.5665 
46 -39.8947 -37.8061 -37.3866* -85.8124 -67.9563 -74.5783 
47 -26.7598 -20.5777 -18.1830* -45.2583 -72.9909 -79.0862 
48 -22.6738 -22.2003 -16.8821* -87.0474 -89.4130 -93.7433 
 
Note: Treatment 1, subjects 1 to 15; Treatment 2, subjects 16 to 32; Treatment 3, subjects 33 to 48. 
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Table 2 : Log-Likelihood Ratio Tests of the Nested Models (significant at **1%, *5%) 
 
subject  CEU v SEU   CEU v PT PT v SEU 
1   25.0686**  19.3556**    5.7130* 
2   13.7338**  2.4874 11.2464** 
3   20.0778**  12.4424**    7.6354** 
4   19.7432**  19.7034**    0.0398  
5    4.6294 4.6294* 0.0000  
6   16.5442**  7.8412* 8.7030** 
7   16.2672**  2.4622 13.8050** 
8   12.7410* 1.9282 10.8128** 
9   28.7438**    8.0534*    20.6904** 
10    5.5584 4.3782* 1.1802  
11   19.2280**    4.3142*    14.9138** 
12   18.4330**    8.6694* 9.7636** 
13    1.6420 1.6420 0.0000  
14   20.4960**   11.5272**    8.9688** 
15    8.8524 7.9594* 0.8930  
16 6.7390 5.8548* 0.8842 
17   14.0612**    3.7324 10.3288** 
18   27.0018**    3.3800 23.6218** 
19    7.6814 7.6468* 0.0346  
20    3.2372 2.6564 0.5808  
21   22.7018**   11.7324**   10.9694** 
22    8.9676 1.5050 7.4626** 
23    1.7158 1.1468 0.5690  
24   20.3848**   10.6546* 9.7302** 
25    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
26    1.7274 1.5604 0.1670  
27   12.6180* 7.1990* 5.4190* 
28    6.3632 2.3694 3.9938* 
29   17.3884**   11.7774**    5.6110* 
30    9.9558* 9.4518* 0.5040  
31    9.2384 2.3558 6.8826** 
32   35.7082**    1.9324 33.7758** 
33   10.5462* 9.9614* 0.5848  
34   11.6386* 6.6848* 4.9538* 
35   11.4368*    11.3910**    0.0458  
36   27.3222**   19.6536**    7.6686** 
37   17.5672**    5.5674*    11.9998** 
38    2.1174 2.0112 0.1062  
39  136.9302**    1.4930    135.4372** 
40    3.1870 3.1870 0.0000  
41    5.3308 4.9702* 0.3606  
42   22.0878**    1.7704 20.3174** 
43   42.2304**    1.8952 40.3352** 
44    0.6584 0.6090 0.0494  
45    0.9680 0.9628 0.0052  
46    5.0162 0.8390 4.1772* 
47   17.1536**    4.7894* 12.3642** 
48 11.5834* 10.6364* 0.9470  
 
Note: Treatment 1, subjects 1 to 15; Treatment 2, subjects 16 to 32; Treatment 3, subjects 33 to 48. 
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Table 3: Vuong Tests between the non-nested models (significant at: *1%; !5%) 
 
SEU versus PT versus CEU versus MaxiMax versus Maximin 
v 
subject 
MaxiMax Maximin MiniMax 
Regret 
MaxiMax Maximin MiniMax 
Regret 
MaxiMax Maximin MiniMax 
Regret 
Maximin MiniMax 
Regret 
MiniMax 
Regret 
1 8.38* 1.58 8.36* 8.64* 1.67 8.64* 10.32* 1.97! 10.32* -6.18* 0.00 6.18* 
2 1.69 4.45* 2.46! 2.04! 5.09* 2.76* 1.19 4.28* 1.93 2.66* 1.36 -2.09! 
3 5.95* 6.12* 7.04* 5.81* 5.68* 6.84* 5.88* 5.82* 7.03* 0.00 1.89 0.90 
4 1.54 5.63* 2.79* 1.25 5.34* 2.51! 1.58 5.88* 2.92* 3.54* 1.95 -2.41! 
5 15.21* 5.13* 15.21* 14.75* 4.83* 14.75* 14.67* 4.24* 14.67* -6.00* 0.00 6.00* 
6 4.75* -2.56* 4.56* 5.63* -2.64* 5.42* 5.80* -3.22* 5.56* -6.40* -0.45 6.19* 
7 -0.73 1.58 1.28 -0.08 1.99! 1.58 -1.69 -0.01 -0.42 1.63 2.77* -0.40 
8 6.07* 5.96* 7.15* 6.62* 6.27* 7.77* 5.83* 5.50* 6.95* -0.73 1.89 1.62 
9 6.59* 4.58* 6.97* 8.19* 5.39* 8.64* 8.71* 5.12* 9.28* -2.60* 0.81 2.98* 
10 4.24* 2.51! 4.43* 3.93* 2.22! 4.11* 3.34* 1.60 3.52* -1.86 0.45 2.09! 
11 4.54* 2.52! 5.57* 5.19* 2.78* 6.16* 4.45* 2.06! 5.37* -1.86 1.65 2.64* 
12 4.31* 2.10! 5.49* 4.61* 2.19! 5.73* 4.33* 1.79 5.40* -2.62* 1.88 3.55* 
13 10.83* 3.79* 10.57* 10.46* 3.51* 10.21* 9.66* 2.80* 9.42* -5.91* -0.45 5.82* 
14 3.97* 6.38* 4.88* 4.15* 6.44* 5.10* 3.77* 6.27* 4.66* 2.23! 1.65 -1.47 
15 6.45* 0.30 6.71* 6.21* 0.03 6.45* 5.69* -0.41 5.99* -6.10* -0.00 6.10* 
16 2.06! 4.03* 2.20! 2.24! 3.30* 2.34! 1.55 2.63* 1.66 1.77 0.45 -1.62 
17 7.30* 3.43* 7.86* 7.75* 3.53* 8.30* 6.93* 2.82* 7.48* -3.07* 0.82 3.49* 
18 4.51* 5.08* 5.40* 5.48* 5.83* 6.39* 4.75* 5.06* 5.66* 0.36 1.65 0.37 
19 8.18* 3.15* 8.47* 7.79* 2.81* 8.08* 7.27* 2.24! 7.53* -3.93* 0.45 4.23* 
20 6.54* 1.04 6.91* 6.33* 0.74 6.68* 5.58* -0.08 5.83* -5.02* 0.38 5.17* 
21 3.14* 1.93 4.23* 3.53* 2.20! 4.64* 3.39* 1.91 4.50* -1.48 1.89 2.38! 
22 1.61 1.67 2.58* 1.71 1.74 2.64* 0.89 0.91 1.79 0.00 1.91 0.90 
23 4.20* -2.24! 3.97* 4.08* -2.69* 3.83* 3.33* -3.79* 3.08* -5.17* -0.45 4.99* 
24 2.05! 1.62 3.23* 2.33! 1.84 3.49* 1.81 1.49 2.85* -0.18 1.91 1.10 
25 5.31* 16.77* 7.03* 5.01* 16.29* 6.72* 4.10* 14.85* 5.77* 6.17* 2.56* -4.58* 
26 6.33* 2.64* 6.57* 6.01* 2.30! 6.25* 5.22* 1.42 5.45* -3.08* 0.45 3.36* 
27 6.80* 2.80* 7.23* 6.56* 2.65* 6.93* 6.06* 2.16! 6.42* -3.79* 0.81 4.17* 
28 6.77* 2.57* 6.62* 6.46* 2.38! 6.30* 5.92* 1.78 5.75* -4.96* -0.45 4.86* 
29 4.91* 6.42* 5.74* 5.01* 6.46* 5.87* 4.75* 6.82* 5.62* 1.83 1.64 -1.10 
30 -0.54 1.81 0.66 -0.80 1.54 0.37 -1.18 1.32 0.03 2.49! 2.31! -1.53 
31 5.86* 3.61* 6.30* 5.96* 3.57* 6.36* 5.07* 2.79* 5.46* -2.23! 0.82 2.61* 
32 1.84 3.06* 3.30* 3.46* 4.97* 4.83* 2.61* 4.10* 3.95* 1.10 2.30! -0.19 
33 5.85* 3.81* 6.39* 5.64* 3.56* 6.16* 5.52* 3.31* 6.01* -1.85 0.82 2.24! 
34 5.73* -0.37 6.01* 6.09* -0.41 6.54* 5.52* -1.03 5.87* -5.68* 0.45 6.12* 
35 0.14 2.62* 2.01! -0.18 2.35! 1.68 -0.43 2.18! 1.38 1.88 2.62* -0.73 
36 2.07! -0.83 2.15! 2.24! -0.60 2.28! -5.57* -5.70* -5.57* -2.12! -0.00 2.12! 
37 7.54* 2.28! 7.27* 8.73* 2.79* 8.50* 8.45* 2.19! 8.20* -5.22* -0.45 5.09* 
38 9.31* 7.81* 9.89* 9.02* 7.52* 9.59* 8.13* 6.55* 8.65* -1.46 0.81 1.81 
39 -53.30* -2.34! -10.30* -16.82* 5.56* -1.67 -10.08* 4.40* -2.40! 10.60* 2.58* -6.51* 
40 8.35* -0.48 8.36* 8.01* -0.93 8.01* 7.15* -1.88 7.16* -7.76* 0.00 7.76* 
41 -4.90* 7.81* 0.98 -5.48* 7.48* 0.69 -12.77* 7.28* 0.07 10.60* 2.94* -5.83* 
42 7.44* 4.47* 7.91* 8.86* 5.06* 9.35* 7.91* 4.27* 8.38* -3.00* 0.81 3.38* 
43 0.23 1.78 1.49 2.03! 3.49* 3.02* 1.34 2.80* 2.33! 1.11 2.08! -0.38 
44 2.83* 8.04* 4.19* 2.50! 7.72* 3.86* 1.55 6.70* 2.90* 4.78* 2.32! -3.67* 
45 15.24* 5.02* 15.25* 14.79* 4.72* 14.80* 13.87* 3.91* 13.87* -6.08* 0.00 6.08* 
46 2.32! 4.43* 3.88* 2.21! 4.27* 3.73* 1.23 3.46* 2.70* 2.36! 2.22! -1.10 
47 5.07* 1.52 6.39* 5.66* 1.89 6.87* 4.97* 1.19 6.08* -2.68* 1.65 3.54* 
48 8.67* 7.72* 10.25* 8.28* 7.27* 9.82* 8.18* 7.28* 9.80* -0.36 1.62 1.09 
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Table 4: The Best Fitting Functionals 
 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Subject Model Subject Model Subject Model 
1 CEU 16 SEU 33 CEU 
2 PT 17 PT 34 CEU 
3 CEU 18 PT 35 CEU* 
4 CEU 19 SEU 36 CEU* 
5 SEU 20 SEU 37 CEU 
6 CEU 21 CEU 38 SEU 
7 CEU 22 PT 39 Maximax 
8 PT 23 Maximin 40 SEU 
9 CEU 24 CEU 41 Maximax* 
10 SEU 25 SEU 42 PT 
11 CEU 26 SEU 43 PT 
12 CEU 27 CEU 44 SEU 
13 SEU 28 PT 45 SEU 
14 CEU 29 CEU 46 PT 
15 SEU 30 CEU 47 CEU 
  31 PT 48 CEU 
  32 PT   
 
*The subjects indicated with an asterisk can be interpreted as following some other rule (see the 
text). 
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Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of Additivity Measures by Treatment 
 
Treatment means standard deviations 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
1 1.021 1.040 1.008 1.059 1.033 0.718 0.275 0.402 0.416 0.392 
2 0.988 1.115 1.046 1.104 1.070 0.286 0.124 0.137 0.173 0.173 
3 0.926 0.941 0.964 0.918 0.925 0.385 0.233 0.196 0.281 0.271 
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Table 6: Percentage of Individuals Classified According to Ambiguity Attitudes and 
Treatment (number of subjects in brackets)16 
 
 
  Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 All treatments 
ambiguity-averse 67% (10) 64% (11) 50% (8) 60% (29) S1 
ambiguity-loving 33% (5) 36% (6) 50% (8) 40% (19) 
ambiguity-averse 40% (6) 24% (4) 56% (9) 40% (19) S2 
ambiguity-loving 60% (9) 76% (13) 44% (7) 60% (29) 
ambiguity-averse 47% (7) 41% (7) 44% (7) 44% (21) S3 
ambiguity-loving 53% (8) 59% (10) 56% (9) 66% (27) 
ambiguity-averse 47% (7) 29% (5) 44% (7) 40% (19) S4 
ambiguity-loving 53% (8) 71% (12) 56% (9) 60% (29) 
ambiguity-averse 53% (8) 41% (7) 44% (7) 46% (22) S5 
ambiguity-loving 47% (7) 59% (10) 56% (9) 54% (26) 
                                                 
16 The data are derived from the additivity measures, as defined in equation (8) 
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Figure 1: Scatters of the First Two Additivity Measures 
 
These are scatters of S2 against S1, by treatment 
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Figure 2: Scatters of S3, S4  and S5 against S1  
 
2.1: S3 against S1 by treatment (tr) 
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2.2: S4 against S1 by treatment (tr) 
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2.3: S5 against S1 by treatment (tr) 
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 Appendix 1: The Experimental Instructions 
EXEC                    Centre for Experimental Economics at the University of York 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment. MIUR (the Italian ministry for the universities) has provided the funds 
to finance this research. Depending on your decisions you may earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash immediately after the end of the experiment. This sum will 
be composed of the £10 participation fee plus your ‘earnings’ from a lottery. This latter could be a 
loss of £10, a gain of £10 or gain of £100.  You cannot walk away from this experiment with less 
money than that with which you arrived, though you might walk away with £20 more or with £110 
more. 
 
There are no right or wrong ways to complete the experiment, but the decisions that you take will 
have implications for what you are paid at the end of the experiment. This depends partly on the 
decisions that you take during the experiment and partly on chance. So you will need to read these 
instructions carefully. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire and to sign a 
receipt for the payment that you received, and to acknowledge that you participated voluntarily in 
the experiment. The results of the experiment will be used for the purpose of academic research and 
will be published and used in such a way that your anonymity will be preserved. 
 
 
Outline of the experiment 
 
You will be asked 162 questions. Each will be of the same type. You will be presented with two 
lotteries and you will be asked which you prefer. After you have answered all 162 questions, one of 
them will be selected at random, the lottery that you said that you preferred on that question will be 
played out, and you will be paid the outcome: if the outcome is a loss of £10 you will leave the 
experiment with the same as when you came; if the outcome is a gain of £10 you will leave the 
experiment with £20 more than when you came; if the outcome is a gain of £100 you will leave the 
experiment with £110 more than when you came. If you did not express a preference on the selected 
question then one of the two lotteries will be selected at random and played out. It is clearly in your 
interests to answer each question as if that were the question to be played out. 
 
 
The Bingo Blower 
 
You will have noticed a Bingo Blower in the laboratory. In this Blower there are balls of three 
different colours: pink, blue and yellow. The balls are constantly being blown about in the Blower. 
At the end of the experiment, when we come to play out your preferred choice on one of the 
questions, we will use this Bingo Blower to determine a colour: we will allow you to open the exit 
chute – this will lead to one ball being expelled. Obviously this expulsion will be done at random as 
there is no way that you can control the colour of the ball that emerges. The colour of the ball and 
the lottery that you chose on the question that was selected will determine your payment. 
 
 
 29
The Questions 
 
A sample question is illustrated in the Figure attached to these Instructions. In this figure, there are 
two lotteries – that on the left and that on the right. The lottery on the left would lead to a loss of 
£10 if the ball expelled was yellow, to a gain of £10 if the ball expelled was blue and to a gain of 
£100 if the ball expelled was pink. The lottery on the right would lead to a loss of £10 if the ball 
expelled was pink or blue and to a gain of £10 if the ball expelled was yellow. You have to decide 
for each question whether you prefer the lottery on the left or that on the right. You should indicate 
your choice by clicking on the box below the appropriate lottery. You will be given at least 30 
seconds to make up your mind and you cannot proceed to the next question until these 30 seconds 
have elapsed. The number of seconds left to make your decision will be indicated at the bottom of 
the screen. If you want more time, simply click on ‘STOP THE CLOCK’; then click on ‘RESTART 
THE CLOCK’ when you are happy to proceed. If the 30 seconds have elapsed and you have not 
taken a decision then ‘no decision’ will be recorded for that question. 
 
 
The end of the experiment 
 
After you have answered all 162 questions you will be asked to call over an experimenter. In front 
of him or her you will choose at random one of the questions - by picking at random a ticket from a 
set of cloakroom tickets numbered from 1 to 162. The computer will recall that question and your 
answer to it, and then you will play out your preferred choice on that question – in the manner 
described above. If you did not take a decision on that question then you will toss a coin to 
determine which of the two lotteries will be played out. You will then be asked to fill in a short 
questionnaire. We will then pay you, you will sign a receipt and then you will be free to go. Note 
that the experiment will take at least 81 minutes of your time. You can take longer and it is clearly 
in your interests to be as careful as you can when you are answering the questions. 
 
 
If you have any questions at any stage, please ask one of the experimenters. 
 
 
John Hey     Gianna Lotito     Anna Maffioletti 
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